Does outsourcing IT to an MSP mean security is covered?

An MSP runs the operations it is paid for, but security governance stays with the company, and the boundary between the two is rarely drawn.

· Founder and Chief Product Officer, Diligenze

The short answer

No. An MSP covers the operational work it is contracted to do: patching, monitoring, backups and restores. It does not own the company's security governance, which means the policies, training, incident response plan and recovery objectives that decide how the business handles risk.

Those are decisions about the business and its risk tolerance, and no provider can make them on a client's behalf. When a company says security is covered because it pays an MSP, what it usually means is that the operational tasks are covered and the boundary between the two sides has never been drawn.

For a buyer, that undrawn boundary is the finding. Not the quality of the MSP's work, which is often perfectly sound, but the fact that neither side can say with confidence which responsibilities are theirs.

What I hear in assessments

"We do not need security or policies and procedures in house because our MSP does it." This comes up in most Diligenze assessments where an MSP is involved. The company tells me security, disaster recovery and operations are covered, because that is what they pay the provider for.

Then I ask what happens when something goes wrong. Who declares an incident? Who calls whom, and in what order? When was the recovery plan last tested?

Usually the answer is that the MSP would handle it. When I put the same questions to the MSP, it turns out they would handle their part. Nobody has walked the whole thing end to end, and no tabletop exercise has ever been run.

Then I read the contract. It almost never says what the company assumed it said.

Nobody in that conversation is being careless. The company bought a service in good faith and the provider is delivering what it was engaged to deliver. Each side simply assumed the other had the pieces in between.

Where does the MSP's responsibility end?

Usually at operations. Governance stays with the company, whether or not anyone there has picked it up.

An MSP will patch, monitor, back up and restore. Those are tasks, and a good provider performs them well. Governance is different: it sets what the tasks are for. How long can the business tolerate being down? Who needs security training? What counts as an incident, and who has the authority to declare one? Those answers have to come from the business, because they depend on what the business can afford to lose.

The confusion is understandable. From inside the company, outsourcing IT feels like outsourcing the whole problem. But a provider can only execute against the decisions it has been given. Where those decisions were never made, the provider fills the gap with its own defaults, or leaves it empty.

Why disaster recovery is where the gap shows first

Disaster recovery is the gap that surfaces most often, because it is where operations and governance have to meet.

There is a plan in the sense that backups exist. There is no plan in the sense that anyone has agreed how long the business can be down, tested whether that is achievable, or coordinated the company's steps with the provider's.

Backups answer whether data can be recovered. They do not answer how long recovery takes, what order systems come back in, who makes the call, or how customers are told. Those questions sit on the company's side of the line, and when nobody has answered them, the first real test of the plan is the incident itself.

For a buyer, untested recovery is a question about the continuity of the business being acquired, not a technical detail. A recovery objective nobody has agreed is a risk nobody has sized.

Can the MSP show who touched the environment?

It should be able to. Attributing access and changes to a named technician has been a mature capability for years, and when a provider says it cannot do this, that is worth pursuing.

An MSP once told me during an assessment that identifying which of their staff had logged into a customer environment was simply not a capability they had. That may have been true a long time ago. It is not now.

The tooling for this matured years ago. You can attribute a change to the specific technician who made it, confirm it was approved, and distinguish it from something automated or malicious. That last part is the one that matters: if you cannot tell which human made a change, you also cannot tell whether a human made it at all.

I raised it, explained how it is typically done, and they took it on board. That runs against how diligence is usually understood. The assumption is that an assessor is there to find fault and hand over a list. But in most engagements the target and its providers are still going to exist after the deal, often under the same buyer, and giving them something usable is not outside the job.

It also produces better information. A provider who feels examined tends to answer narrowly. A provider who feels they are getting something out of the conversation tends to tell you what is actually going on, which is what you were trying to establish in the first place.

What to check

When Diligenze reviews a target that relies on an MSP, the work is less about grading the provider and more about mapping the line between the two parties. These questions do most of that work.

  • Ask the company, and separately the MSP, which side owns each responsibility: security policies, training, incident response and disaster recovery. Compare the answers.
  • Read the contract or statement of work for what the MSP is actually obliged to do, and set it against what the company believes it bought.
  • Ask who declares an incident, and who calls whom in what order. If the answer is "the MSP would handle it", put the same question to the MSP.
  • Ask when the recovery plan was last tested, and whether a tabletop exercise has ever been run with both parties involved.
  • Ask whether anyone has agreed how long the business can be down, and whether that has been tested as achievable.
  • Ask the MSP how it attributes access and changes in the customer environment to individual technicians, and how it tells approved changes from automated or malicious ones.
  • Check who inside the company owns the MSP relationship and the governance decisions the provider depends on.

What this does not mean

None of this means the MSP is doing a bad job, or that relying on one is a weakness. For many smaller companies an MSP brings capability they could not build in house, and the operational work is often done well.

The finding is the undrawn boundary. The question worth asking is not whether a target has an MSP. It is whether the company could name, right now, which side of the line each responsibility sits on, and whether the MSP would give the same answer.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does an MSP handle cybersecurity for a company?
An MSP typically handles the operational security tasks it is contracted for, such as patching, monitoring, backups and restores. It does not own the company's security governance: policies, training, incident response planning and recovery objectives. Those remain the company's decisions, whether or not anyone has made them.
What is the company responsible for when IT is outsourced to an MSP?
The company remains responsible for governance: its security policies, staff training, incident response plan and recovery objectives, including how long the business can be down. The MSP performs operational work against those decisions. Where the decisions were never made, nobody owns them.
Why is disaster recovery a common gap when IT is outsourced?
Backups often exist, but nobody has agreed how long the business can be down, tested whether that is achievable, or coordinated the company's recovery steps with the provider's. Backups show that data can be restored. They do not show that the business can recover in a time it can live with.
Should an MSP be able to show which technician accessed a client environment?
Yes. The tooling to attribute access and changes to a named technician, confirm they were approved, and distinguish them from automated or malicious activity has been mature for years. If a provider cannot tell which person made a change, it cannot tell whether a person made it at all.
How should a buyer assess a target that relies on an MSP?
Ask the company and the MSP separately which side owns each security and recovery responsibility, and compare the answers. Read the contract against what the company believes it bought. Check whether incident response and recovery have ever been tested end to end with both parties involved.

Diligence that maps where the MSP's job ends

Diligenze delivers technology and cybersecurity due diligence across the transaction lifecycle: pre-LOI screening, full technology diligence covering architecture, security, scalability, technical debt, team and IP, and post-close integration planning. Our compliance and regulatory reviews support SOC, PCI DSS, HIPAA, HITRUST, CMMC and ISO 27001, alongside cyber risk assessments and portfolio risk reviews. Firms partner with our senior practitioners on complex engagements or deploy our platform across their practice. If you would prefer to start on your own, the Diligenze Readiness Index is a free self-service scan.

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